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That free trade provides discipline on the behaviour 
of firms, and thus is likely to have a beneficial effect on mar­
ket performance is a relatively uncontroversial proposition. In­
terest has accordingly shifted towards the practical problem of 
measuring the strength of this pro-competitive force in practice1. 
In this paper, we wish to present and apply a new measurement 
technique to this problem. The principal virtues of our approach 
are that it allows sufficient flexibility both to permit inter­
industry and inter-temporal variations in the impact of trade on 
performance, as well as to chart feedback from industry perfor­
mance to induced changes in the strength of these competitive 
forces.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section I, we 
set out the econometric model that forms the basis of our approach. 
The empirical implementation of the model is discussed in Section 
II. This discussion covers not only the choice and measurement 
of variables, but also some interesting empirical results obtained 
by applying the model to a large sample of Belgian data. Section 



























































































I - A GENERAL MODEL
1.1. Structure-performance models posit a relationship bet­
ween profitability and market structure in which commonly the 
degree of foreign competition exerts an influence on profit mar­
gins which is independent of the structure of the domestic market. 
Empirical analyses of this relationship have generally characte­
rised the dimensions of market structure as including the level 
of domestic concentration, the growth of demand, the degree of 
product differentiation, and have added variables that capture 
international factors, such as imports, exports and multinational 
activity.
By contrast, we propose to look at how the degree of 
openness alters the relationship between structure and perfor­
mance. The reason is that when comparing the two extreme situa­
tions where the industry is completely open to trade and where 
there is complete absence of trade, we believe that the "fully 
closed" equilibrium cannot be derived from the "fully open" one 
simply by setting all foreign factors equal to zero. Consider, 
for example, industry concentration. It is liable to be positi­
vely associated with profits in a closed sector and unrelated to 
profits in an open sector, so that one cannot reasonably hold 
openness or concentration constant and trace the association of 
the other with profits. If concentration were the only domestic 
market structure variable to have such a conditionalized effect, 
then we would naturally turn to a non-linear interactive speci­
fication (e.g. Pugel, 1980; Jacquemin & al, 1980; Lyons, 1982; 
Huveneers, 1981). Our view is, however, that this argument ap­
plies to all domestic market structure variables, and that in­
clines us to think in terms of two regimes: a "fully open struc­




























































































1.2. To properly examine the effects of trade on profits,
one must work out what would have happened in the event of com­
plete absence of trade and in the event of complete openness to 
trade. One can then compare the current situation with these two 
counterfactuals, and try to answer the following questions: "To 
what extent has trade modified performance?" (to answer this, 
compare actual profits to those which would have occured in the 
complete absence of trade) and "To what extent could trade still 
further modify performance?" (to answer this, compare actual pro­
fits to those which would have occurred if the sector were com­
pletely open). Since current performance is seen as being bounded 
by these two benchmarks, what is also needed in this approach is 
an "indicator function" reflecting openness, and thus indicating 
the distance current performance is from either benchmarks. To 
construct the model then requires two counterfactual constructions 
and an indicator function.
The two counterfactuals are constructed as follows.
Let tt9 denote profits were industry i to be completely closed,
let tt9 denote profits were industry i to be completely open, and
let be the indicator function reflecting the extent to which
industry i is, in fact, open to international competition. 
Evidentally:
(1 ) = V ?  + ^ i ^ i
Both and A^ are directly observable, but it? and tt? are not 
and they must be constructed. In general, what we wish to do is 
to imagine an industry equilibrium with and without trade, and 
we know that there are overlapping sets of variables which would 
describe industry performance in these cases. Hence, we can use 
this set (collectively x^) to proxy the two unknowns, tt? and tt9, 
and we posit (these are not testable hypotheses) that:
KO V o , o
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where some a£ or a£ may be zero. The unknown values of the pro­
blem, tt9 and tt9, have now been re-expressed in terms of the un­
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Since tt̂ , and the Kx^'s are all observed, standard regression 
procedures will produce estimates of the a£ and a£, from which 
estimates of it? and can be constructed.
o CThese estimated values of tty and tt̂  enable us to ans­
wer part of the problem that we have posed ourselves; viz. to 
what extent does "openness" affect "performance"? There are ob­
viously several "trade differentials" that we can compute, but 
consider first the raw differential 6,^:
(4)
which measures the total potential impact trade can have on per­
formance for each industry i. If, from (2), tt9 and tt9 are normal­
ly distributed, then so will be the estimates of tt9 and tt?, and
hence so will be 6,.. The estimated value of 6,. is:ii i l
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where V(a£ - a£) is 
variance with (a^ -
the variance of a£ -
a9). It then follows 
J




is distributed as Student-t with k-1 degrees of freedom, and so 
can be used to determine whether a 1 % or 5% confidence interval 
around 6j^ contains zero. Thus, not only can we compute a raw tra­
de differential to each industry i, but we also can compute a 
confidence interval surrounding that estimate. This is an impor­
tant advantage of our general approach, because it allows us to 
test whether the industry specific estimated differential is 
significantly different from zero for each industry i.
It is also the case that our method contains an expla­
nation of inter-industry variations in  ̂ (or, for that matter, 
in any other trade differential we care to compute). From (5), 
it is clear that 6j ̂  is ultimately a function of the x ^ »  and 
that tt? ^ tt? to the extent that = a£ for each k. Hence, 
ak = ak indicates that the variable x^ plays no role in affecting 
trade differentials, while ^ a£ indicates that x^ affects in­
dustrial profitability differently according to the openness 
of the sector. Since the trade differential is just the sum of 
these differences in impact, the explanation of its inter-industry 
variation is an immediate and automatic consequence of its esti­
mation.
Of course, 
tial we can compute.
is not the only kind of trade differen- 





























































































6 2i measures the potential percentage difference in profits due 
to trade, while 5  ̂measures the actual effect trade has had re­
lative to 6-ĵ , the total potential impact. Thus, S 3i measures the 
potential scope for further improving industry performance by in­
creasing openness.
1.3. It is worth stressing that this new approach to assessing
trade differentials contains as special cases (i.e. as testable 
simplifications) two models familiar from the literature. Consi­
der first the closed economy structure-performance model. This 






Comparing (9) to (3), it is clear that the latter is a varying 
parameter model, with the coefficient on each variable dif­
ferent in each industry i. To the extent that x̂ , has different 
effects on profits when an industry is more or less open (i.e. 
ak ^ ak̂  and t 0 tlie extent that different industries are more 
or less open  ̂ f \^) , then 3^ in (9) cannot be a measure of the 
effect on tt̂  of increasing x^ by one unit since that effect is 
industry specific and dependent on x^. This point can be made 
more precisely. For simplicity suppose that K = 1, and we take 
it that ct° ¥ ac, 7i so that (3) is the correct model. Then,
if one regresses the incorrect model (9), this is equivalent to 
omitting a variable (a° - aC){A^x^} and, by the conventional 
formula for omitted variables bias, the OLS estimator has bias: 
(a° - aC)r, where r is the coefficient of {x^x^} in a regression 
on x.. Hence, to the extent that values of a- are associated 
with the extent of openness, then, when \^ ^ \ or a° 7* ctc , esti­
mates of the parameters of the structure-performance model (9) 
are biased. Of course (3) is the more general model, and nests 
(9); that is, the conventional closed economy structure-perfor­




























































































The second constructive comparison one can make is bet­
ween (3) and traditional trade as discipline regressions2. These 
are constructed as follows: the difference between completely 
open and completely closed profitability is taken to be constant 
across industries, so that a unit increase in L  has the same 
effect on actual profits in all industries. Thus.
(1 0 ) - tt? = 6
so that, using (1 ):
(1 1 ) TTi = TT̂  - exi
Since from (10), the difference between tt? and u? is a constant, 
then except for the constant term in (2 ), (call it k = 1 )
and so:




ca, x ., + k ik
and (1 1 ) becomes:
(13)
K
kf2 °tkXik " 0Ai + U1 .
Thus, the traditional trade as discipline regression is a testable
simplification of our general model (3), emerging when = a^,
k = 2 ,....,K; that is, when trade evenly disciplines all industries.
By almost exactly the same argument as used above, it is the case
that the parameters of (13) will all be estimated with bias if
A. or x. is correlated with {A.x.} in the case where a? ^ a?. i l l i  k ' k
Hence, (4) is a generalization of two familiar models 
of the literature both of which involve biased estimation of para­
meters whenever the extent of openness is systematically associa­
ted with other determinants of profits whose impact is conditional 




























































































1.4. One of the principal worries in a measurement exercise
such as this is to avoid bias, and an obvious source of such pro­
blems lies in the potential feedback from market performance to 
the extent of openness. The notion that entry responds to current 
excess profitability is widely accepted, and has found practical 
expression in an extensive empirical literature3 which we shall 
build on here. Before doing so, however, it is worth making a 
slight digression to put the statistical problem we are facing 
in a clear light.
We wish consistent, unbiased, and efficient estimates 
of the parameters of (3), and the need to account for feedback 
arises because A^ may not be "exogeneous" (for a precise defini­
tion, see Engle & al, 1983) to the process generating A^ (i.e. 
to equation (3)). Since our interest is in the parameters of (3) 
and not in feedback per se, we can concentrate only on that as­
pect of feedback induced by tt̂ . This considerably simplifies 
the feedback equation: we need only capture that part of feed­
back which is potentially liable to create bias and inconsisten­
cy in the estimation of (3).
Basically, then, we wish to model such changes in A ̂ 
as are dependent on current excess profitability. Following well 
established traditions (see the theoretical model of Gaskins 
(1971) and the empirical literature cited in footnote 3), we 
imagine the rate of growth of A ̂  to depend on the difference 
between current profits, and tt9, after which point domestic 
profits will no longer induce trade flows. Since one imagines 
that increases in the strength of the signal (tt̂ -tt'?) will attract 
an increasingly lar§e flow of trade, it is natural to write:
AA.
(14) log(1 + — ~) = Y^ i  ” "i* + ei‘
It is easily shown that this leads to a time path for A with a 




























































































(15) exp (y (tk - tt°) } - 1
Evidentally, X increases or decreases as tv ^  tt°, 
such discrepancies with a sensitivity given by y.
(2), (14) can be written:
^  • q  Q Q
(16) log (1 + _ ) =  yU m v + (1 - Xi)ujL - iti }A •
K c o
= Y(1-*lH £ =:l<0k - W ’ + V
An immediate and natural generalization of (15) is to make the 
sensitivity parameter y itself industry specific, letting it depend on 
a multitude of factors (collectively z^) , so that (15) becomes:
(17) lo g  (1 + A^i) = (z y z  ) (1 — A ) (£ (aP -  a ? ) x . k) + e . .
\  £=1 £ £i i k=1 K K ^  1
The feedback from domestic performance to openness as 
captured in the model (14) - (17)is based on fairly simple and 
familiar considerations. The target is tt̂ - ttP, the extent of 
"excess" profits in industry i, and this industry specific tar­
get attracts trade at a rate which is also industry specific, 
depending on various z . Non linearities aside, this is the mostXj
basic adjustment or feedback rule one can imagine. Now, the goal 
of (17) is not to model "openness" per se, but rather to supple­
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What does (17) add to (3)? It is clear from (17) that if (14) 
holds, then and -rn in any period t will be correlated, and 
this is liable to generate bias and inconsistency if (3) is es­
timated alone. Morever, since (3) and (17) share common parameters, 
then there is a clear efficiency gain to estimating the two join­
tly using the cross-equation restrictions arising from such com­
monness. It must be stressed that the superiority of the system 
(3) - (17) over (3) taken alone is a testable hypothesis. To the 
extent that the y^ approach zero, then feedback is diminished 
correspondingly, and the relative superiority of the system (3) — 
(17) is attenuated. Note that y^ -*0 does not imply that changes 
in are random, but rather that they are not accounted for by 
the factors which are important in (3), and this is exactly what 
one means by saying that is "exogenous" to the profits equation'*.
1.5. To summarize, (18) is an empirical model which seems
suitable for relaxing the commonly maintained assumptions that 
trade discipline is the same across all industries, additive, and 
exogenous. Estimation of the unknows and enable us to ef­
ficiently compute a variety of industry specific trade induced 
differentials in industry performance without bias, test their 
difference from zero, and explain them in terms of the altera­
tions in industry equilibrium configurations induced by trade. 
Finally, (18) as a model nests virtually all familiar closed eco­
nomy or trade as discipline models, and hence can be used to sta­




























































































II - EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ESTIMATION
To empirically implement the model requires the choice 
and measurement of t k , the vectors xi and z^, and of \^r as well 
as the examination of several specification issues.
2.1. The dependent variable, profitability, is the price-
cost margin, defined as value added at factor cost minus payroll 
divided by total sales. This accords with conventional characte­
rizations of industry equilibrium under conditions of imperfect 
competition (e.g. Cowling & Waterson, 1976). Such equilibrium 
conditions associate the level of price cost margins with indus­
try structure (represented by some concentration index and an 
unobserved demand elasticity) and industry conduct (represented 
by a set of unobserved conjectures by firms concerning the extent 
of their control over industry price). The nature and pattern of 
such conduct depend a good deal upon other structural features 
of the industry, such as the conditions of entry, the extent of 
industry growth, the extent to which member firms also operate 
elsewhere, and so on. Such considerations lead us to fairly con­
ventional looking vector of variables x^ (some of which will also 
be used for z^)5.
CON = domestic four-firm concentration ratio, exports being 
subtracted from both numerator and denominator and the 
market shares being based on turnover;
RELS = (S2M _ MES) is a measure of the relative efficient size;4
MESC = the average efficient plant size given by the average size 
of the largest plants accountina for 50% of industry ship­
ments divided by market sales;
DIVE = the percentage of firms in each industry, which state





























































































GVA = the growth rate of industry value added between 1970 
and 1975;
RD = the intensity of research and development expenditures 
by industry as a percentage of sales;
ABS = the ratio of depreciation to turnover;
P = a dummy equal to one for producer goods industries and
zero otherwise;
MUL = a dummy having the value of one if-the percentage of 
activities directly controlled by multinational firms 
is anove fifty percent;
IN = the ratio of imports (2x) to total trade (imports + 
exports).
2.2. The two regimes, "open" and "closed", have been writ­
ten in (2) as linear in some or all of the x^. We wish to modi­
fy this slightly, and allow concentration to enter in a non-linear 
fashion. For reasons that have been discussed elsewhere (Geroski, 
1981), we propose to do this by using a linear spline to build 
up a more complex picture than allowed by assuming linearity; 
for reasons that will become evident momentarily, we propose to 
do this only in the tk equation. One other preliminary remark 
concerns the relatively novel variable, RELS. It is defined as 
the difference between the average size of the largest four firms 
and minimum efficient size. If negative, it indicates that the 
leading four firms (on average) suffer a cost disadvantage; if 
positive, it suggests that at least these four do not suffer a 
disadvantage6.
In the model advanced here current profitability is a 
moving weighted average of two benchmark equilibria which are 




























































































The open regime is simply an equilibrium for an industry exposed 
to extensive entry, or credible entry threats. It's primary dis­
tinguishing feature therefore is that one does not expect to see 
an association between profits and concentration: prices reflect 
entry threats, and not the oligopoly consensus developed amongst 
incumbents. Of course, the height of such "limit prices" depends 
on the domestic cost advantage vis-a-vis putative foreign entrants. 
This can be inferred by observing the size of imports relative to 
exports, with high values of this ratio indicating comparative 
domestic disadvantage. Thus, IN is expected to attract a negative 
coefficient in the tt̂  equation and does not enter the closed re­
gime model at all. These two sets of a priori parameter restric­
tions serve to identify the two regimes. As will be seen below, 
the non-linearity of concentration variable means that the two 
regimes in practice are identified by four zero restrictions and, 
in fact, both identifying variables in practice account for a 
reasonable amount of the variation in the respective dependent 
variables.
The remaining exogenous variables can be expected to 
have somewhat different effects on profitability in the two regi­
mes, although there is no reason to rule any of them out of ei­
ther equilibrium a priori. Important scale economies are expected 
to be positively related to it ° as the openness of the industry 
allows it to reach the minimal optimal size, while a negative in­
fluence (a positive effect of RELS) should be exerted on irc (this 
is a "small country" hypothesis) . It is also expected that tt °  
will be lower in a producer goods industry (P=l), as the intensi­
ty of competition is higher for strandardized goods than for 
(more differentiated) consumer goods. If, on the contrary, the 
industries were completely closed,standardization could be requi­
red for some exploitation of scale economies. The growth of the 
added value (GVA) should exert a positive influence mainly on -rr°, 
as the opportunity for exploiting such a growth is believed to be 
higher in an open situation. While the presence of multinationals 




























































































open industry, ttc is expected to be negatively related to MUL as 
the establishment of foreign subsidiaries has constitued an en­
try and therefore could increase the degree of domestic competi­
tion. Two corporate strategy variables are also introduced. It 
is conjectured that, in a closed industry, product diversifica­
tion (DIVE) could play the role of a substitute to international 
expansion and geographical diversification; with the sector be 
completely open, such a product diversification could (on the 
contrary) dilute the international position and the corresponding 
profitability. Research and Development activities, R.D., are 
probably more important to maintain the profitability in an inter­
national context, as competition is increasingly "technological"; 
furthermore, the small size of the domestic market would probably 
not allow large fixed costs. Finally ABS that is a proxy for ca­
pital intensity is expected to exercise a negative effect upon tt°. 
As confirmed by a recent study of large Belgian firms (see Huve- 
neers, 1983), under-capacity affects mainly capital intensive in­
dustries and the corresponding firms confronted to an open market 
then adopt low prices in order to exploit the high elastic inter­
national demand. In a closed situation such a policy is not re­
warding as domestic demand is relatively inelastic, and high pri­
ces are applied.
2.2. The indicator X^ reflects the actual extent to which
industry i is "open to trade", and thus the extent to which tk 
is close to tt° .  The natural inclination is to make X^ depend on 
actually observed trade flows, such as the extent of import pe­
netration (which is how it is measured in traditional trade as 
discipline regressions). The difficulty with this is twofold: 
first, the opportunity to export can clearly affect the profita­
bility of an industry, and, secondly, trade is much like entry 
in the sense that it needs not actually occur in order to have 
effects on profits. On the other hand, to discard completely in­
formation on actual trade flows is to neglect useful information. 




























































































flows in a single measure. To be more precise, X^ is constructed 
as follows: in addition to information on import intensity (IMPS) 
defined as the ratio of imports to domestic consumption, and 
export intensity (EXPS), which is the ratio of export to total 
sales, we also have information in a dichotomous form (a dummy, 
OPEN) which has values of unity when firms in the industry are 
judged to be price takers on international markets, and zero 
when some or substantial domestic pricing discretion is judged 
to exist7. This last piece of information is particularly useful 
as it is a more or less direct observation of pricing conduct. 
This is, of course, the basis of why the two regimes are sepa­
rated (no price dicretion in one, no foreign entry threats in 
the other). Ensuring that 1 e(0,l), we constructed the following 
proxy:
, = IMPS + EXPS + OPEN
H  3
There is relatively little guidance one can find in the 
literature concerning the determinants of the adjustment speed y. 
We have hypothesized that this speed is a function of the degree 
of concentration, the presence of multinationals and the level of 
penetration, as measured by IN. The degree of domestic concentra­
tion will accelerate the feedback effect as long as trade dif­
ferentials linked with domestic market power are more visible and 
attract more easily international pressures. On the contrary, ma­
ny subsidiaries of multinationals in an industry imply that a 
large amount of trade is intra-firm. This could reduce the speed 
of adjustment as multinationals are a priori more able to control 
this process and make it dependent upon their transnational stra­
tegies. Finally, the existing rate of penetration into domestic 
market is expected to exercise a negative impact if the increase 





























































































2.4. A final point on specification regarding (3) concerns
possible time series variation in trade differentials. (3) con­
tains the parameters a^/ and which have all thus far been 
assumed invariant over time, thus making a cross section analysis 
of the industry specific differentials and adjustment speeds the 
natural econometric approach. However, these are testable assump­
tions and so should be tested. In fact, the issue cuts quite 
deeply, since an underlying premise in structure-performance work is that 
the same relatively unchanging, structural variables ought to "ex­
plain" performance year by year over a reasonable period of time 
in a very similar manner. In the context of this study, such sta­
bility in estimated coefficients amounts to stability over time 
in the industry specific trade differentials ans speeds of adjust­
ments, and this is clearly well worth testing. The obvious approach 
is to test the extent to which the time series of cross section 
estimates can be pooled by testing the hypothesis that the esti­
mated parameters take a common value each year. We regard this 
as one of the key tests to be performed.
2.5. Our sample is a population of 82 three digit Belgian
manufacturing industries for the years 1973-1978.
The first step8 we took was to ascertain the nature of 
the linearity between concentration and profits. While there was 
a little year to year variation in the details, we found fairly 
strong evidence against linearity. Noticeable breaks in the linear 
relationship occured in the region of CON =.55 (ell) and .75(cl2), 
with the relation rising, then falling and finally rising again 
in the heaviest concentrated classes. Given this, we estimated (3) each year 
(by OLS), the results indicating that most of the structural va­
riables have, as hypothesized, significantly different associa­
tions with profitability depending on the extent of openness.
The second step was to examine the role of (14) and, in 
particular, whether (18) could be simplified statistically to (3). 




























































































proved impossible to get acceptable estimates of (16) or (17) 
separately, much less jointly in (18) using full information 
estimation methods. The year by year variation in y parameters 
was large, and they were generally individually and always (save for 1973) 
collectively, insignificantly different from zero. Table I contains 
the estimation of (18) for 1973 alone. The two models (i.e. with 
and without (14)) lead to fairly similar results. Besides ABS,
P and MUL, all the variables appear to exert distinct impacts on 
ttc and tt°; furthermore, several of the differentials are signi­
ficant. The determinants of the adjustment speed, y, are all si­
gnificant and conform to our expectations.
It remains that the failure of the feedback equation 
at the overall level is a little unexpected (e.g. see the results 
for a completely linear system in Geroski, 1982) and a little 
puzzling. It is only with some caution that we have decided to 
proceed with (3) alone. While reasonable, the theoretical feed­
back model (14) is not so utterly persuasive a priori as to over­
whelm fairly discouraging sample evidence. Our view is that the 
problem is mainly one of temporal stability, in the feedback 
equation, and that various exogenous shocks seriously disrupted 
Belgian trade flows from 1974 to 1978 in a way which obscured 
and, indeed, negated feedback effects.
2.6. The third step to be taken was to consider the hypo­
thesis that the relationships shown on Table I are stable through 
the entire period, 1973-1978. While straightorward conceptually 
(the Chow test is the appropriate test provided that the varian­
ces in individual year equations are not too different), this 
test is, in many ways, the most exciting practically speaking.
A set of trade differentials observed at very different levels 
in successive years is strong evidence in favour of rejecting the 
model and its estimates altogether, since it is hardly conceiva­
ble that what we believe to be due to stable structural factors 




























































































In fact, there is no doubt simply by visual inspection 
of the annual regressions that stability is the order of the 
day. The Chow test produced a calculated F =.78 and this is well 
above 5% significance levels. The pooled estimates of the single 
equation (3) for 1973-1978 are shown as Table II. Their inter­
pretation is pretty much the same as discussed earlier for 1973 
alone, on Table I. Almost all differentials are now significant 
and the comparison of equation I and II shows that the coefficients 
remain fairly stable despite the change in variables. Furthermore, 
as expected, MESC and RELS have opposite signs.
2.7, The output of the exercise thus far is a large set of
estimates of the parameters of "open" and "closed" regime equi-
o clibria as embodied in the and equations, equations (2 ). 
There are numerous ways of summarizing this information, but the 
simplest is by considering the vectors of estimated differentials 
6 1 i / 6zi and 63± (see Table III).
The average value of the raw differential 6j across all 
industries and all years is .065. Given that the all year - all 
industry average value of is .099, it suggests that trade pro­
vides a potentially large but by no means overpowering modification 
of domestic performance. Amongst the 75% or so differentials which 
were significantly different from zero9, the average value of Sj 
is .084. Of course, it is not always the case that ttc > tt°, and 
the average value of for the 48 vectors which show a positive 
differential is . 1 8 0 whilst it amounts to -.161 in the case of 
the 18 negative 6^ 3 . The exogenous variables x^ which seem to 
"cause" to turn negative are DIVE and IN. <5 3 indicates that 
the potential for further impact is still large. Maximum and mi­
nimum values of Sj, 6 2 and 6 3 suggest a wide variance in effect 





























































































Regression Equations Relating Price-Cost Margins 
to Structural Determinants
Comparison between the single equation model and the two equations model; 
year 1973, n= 82, * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 
5% level in two-tailed tests.






























































































































































Regression Equation Relating Price-Cost Margins to Structural 
Determinants, Pooling Cross-Sections and Time-Series Data, n = 492
Equation (3) Equation (3/)
c o c oa a a a




RELS .296** -.117** MESC -.267** .079**
DIVE .368** -.544** • .371** -.552**
GVA -.029** .051** -.029** .053**
RD -.128 1.439* -.139 1.452*
ABS 1.034** -.135** 1.058** -.195**
P .038** -.076** .041** -.081**





Equation (3') involves the substitution of a conventional minimum 
efficient scale estimate, MESC, for RELS in order to establish 




































































































D1 .084 .215 -1.017 .458
D2 3.39 6.45 .076 40.74





























































































In this paper, we have presented a new econometric ve- 
hicule to use in measuring the effects of trade on domestic in­
dustry performance. This method had a number of distinct advanta­
ges which, we trust, are now evident. The problems with it are 
also reasonably clear. In our application, we have used relati­
vely simple characterizations of open and closed equilibria, 
separating and identifying the two primarily by four zero res­
trictions. Clearly a more precise specification of either or both 
equilibria will incrase the amount of information on trade dif­
ferentials that one can extract from the data. We have also been 
a little crude in specifying our indicator function which locates 
current performance between these two benchmark regimes. The 
specification reported here represents a compromise between a 
paucity of theoretical guidance, a frustrating exploration of 
alternative specifications (which essentially attempted to com­
bine the information at hand in rather non-linear fashions, or 
using data determined relative weights), and time. There are re­
wards to be reaped by further work in this line. Finally, although%
we are reasonably happy with it's specification a priori, the 
feedback equation performed erratically. We believe this to be 
due to the turbulence of the years contained in the sample, and 
are satisfied that our estimates of the trade differential are 
reasonably consistent and unbiased. While this last result is 
the real point of introducing the feedback equation, our interest 
in it per se is such that it's failure remains a little insa- 
tisf ying.
Our conclusions on the role of trade as a discipline 
of Belgian industry performance are that trade has a large but 
by no means overpowering effect on performance, that this effect 
can be observed in about 75% of Belgian manufacturing industries 
(the others seem to provide absolutely no scope for such disci­




























































































of the effect is largely dependent upon industry cost conditions 
(and the size of minimum efficient scale), industry concentra­
tion, and the extent of industry diversification of one form or 
another. During times in which policy pronouncements frequently 
take the form of denouncing the growth of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade, these results can usefully introduce a small 
but much needed note of skepticism to set against sweeping claims 
























































































































































































1. For surveys, see Caves (1980); Scherer (1980, chapter 9), and 
Jacquemin (1982).
2. Examples of this approach are given by Esposito & Esposito 
(1971); J. Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974); Pagoulatos and Sorensen 
(1976); Hitiris (1978) and Geroski (1982). For some further re­
marks on this model, see Geroski and Jacquemin (1981).
3. See Orr (1974); Masson and Shaanan (1982) for good examples 
of this type of work; Geroski (1983) is a survey of this material.
4. Note that (14) is really only one part of the feedback to be 
expected (although it is that part which is crucial to our purpo­
ses here). It is clear that the targets guiding foreign producers 
sending products to domestic markets are not the total profits 
earned by domestic firms. That is, tt̂  = tt? merely implies that 
profits for domestic firms will not be affected by changes in 
exports or imports at the margin, not that further imports and 
exports will not affect the foreign earnings of domestic produ­
cers on exports, or the domestic earnings of foreign producers
on imports and so cease when tk = it?. These trade flows which do 
not respond to the signal (tt̂  - tt?) are subsumed into the resu- 
dual in (14) where, of course, they introduce no bias vis-a-vis 
the parameters of (3).
5. One obvious omission from this list is a variable reflecting 
advertising intensity. This variable is not available in Belgium 
at our level of analysis.
6 . Over the whole sample, 205 observations take a negative value 
for RELS with an average of -.121, whilst the average of the 287 




























































































7. This classification is based on an empirical analysis of pri­
ce formation in Belgium (Huyeneers, 1981) . Sectors for which the 
price on the domestic market appears not be significantly dif­
ferent from the price prevailing in foreign markets are classified 
as price-takers whilst sectors characterized by a significant 
link between variations in prices and variations in domestic costs, 
are classified as sheltered.
8 . There was some question concerning heteroscedasticity in (3)
To the extent that tt? ^ tt? , then the variance of the residual 
is:
var(yi(l - Ai)+ y ^  ) - ( l - A ^ f i ^  + A?6*i '+ 2^(1 - Ai)cov(y?,y?) 
Hence, the ratio of error variance in industry i to that of j is:
1 + A?(—  
1 52
/ ° c\ cov(y ,y )1) + 2 A . ( 1  -  A . )1 1 ► 2
6c
1 + A2(-^
J 6 2 c
1) + 2A.  (1 ~ A . ) c o v ( y  »y- )
J J 62c
A grid search assuming cov ( . ) = 0 failed to suggest that S( 
differed markedly from 62.
9. There was little variance over years in the number of signifi­
cant differences. Furthermore, almost the same sectors over time 
show non significant differentials. This allows us to compute the 
average differential over the period for each sector. In order to 
focus on significant differences, the following sectors: 221, 223, 
255, 311, 314, 316, 321, 341, 413, 414, 415, 420, 421, 436, 439, 
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